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Abstract
Should mergers among nonproﬁt organizations be regulated diﬀerently
than mergers among for-proﬁt ﬁrms? The relevant empirical literature is
highly controversial, the theoretical literature is scarce. I analyze the ques-
tion by modeling duopoly competition with quality-diﬀerentiated goods. I
compare welfare eﬀects of mergers between ﬁrms with the eﬀects of merg-
ers between nonproﬁts dominated by consumers, workers, suppliers, and
pure donors respectively. I ﬁnd that mergers both among ﬁrms and among
most types of nonproﬁts do not increase welfare. Mergers among consumer-
dominated nonproﬁts, however, can improve welfare. These results imply
for competition law and regulation that “nonproﬁt” might be too crude a
label for organizations with varying goals. Consequently, mergers among
certain nonproﬁt organizations should not necessarily be treated in the
same way as mergers among for-proﬁt ﬁrms – a notion that is absent in
current merger guidelines both in the US and the EU.
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Should mergers among nonproﬁt organizations be regulated? If so, should they
be regulated diﬀerently than mergers among for-proﬁt ﬁrms?1 The empirical
literature on comparisons of nonproﬁts (NFPs) and proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms (FPs)
is highly controversial,2 and empirical evidence on mergers between nonproﬁts is
very limited.3 A recent theoretical paper, by Philipson and Posner (2006), has
analyzed the questions raised above and concluded that the fact that antitrust law
does not distinguish between the nonproﬁt and the for-proﬁt sectors, is eﬃcient.
I challenge the view and main result of Philipson and Posner. I start from the
idea that, while it is widely undisputed that owners of FPs maximize proﬁts, it is
not clear at all what decision makers in nonproﬁts optimize.4 To be as unbiased
and conclusive as possible I propose a governance-based approach and model
de facto control over nonproﬁts by four generic stakeholder groups: consumers,
workers, suppliers, and pure donors. Whatever governance mechanism is in place,
the owner being pivotal for a certain decision must be a member of one of these
groups. I assume rational objective functions characterizing each group and model
duopoly competition with quality-diﬀerentiated goods for each type of owners in
a game related to Shaked and Sutton (1982). The health care market serves as a
suitable application:5 I assume that consumers (patients) have inelastic demand
1These questions have been raised in recent consulting work for associations of health care
providers and by competition authorities and sector regulators in the Netherlands, who have
to cope with the ongoing concentration in health care and other markets with nonproﬁts.
2Chou (2002, p.297) lists several empirical studies that compare quality levels produced
by nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt nursing homes and reports diverging results (some ﬁnd that NFPs
produce higher quality, others are ambiguous). Malani et al. (2003) survey the literature on
nonproﬁts in the US health care sector and conclude that existing data are mostly inconclusive.
3A notable exemption is the case study by Vita and Sacher (2001). By deﬁnition of a case
study, however, conclusions cannot by generalized.
4Deneﬀe and Masson (2002) study this question empirically by using a data-set on hospitals
in Virginia. Their ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that NFP hospitals consider both
proﬁts and output as objectives—a notion that I capture via modeling separation of ownership
and control below. Horwitz (2007) studies the eﬀect of nonproﬁt ownership on the provision
of medical services for the poor by using survey data from US hospitals and demographic data
from the US Census. She ﬁnds that nonproﬁt hospitals, unlike proﬁt-maximizers, partly act in
the public interest by providing services not provided by other types of hospitals. Horwitz and
Nichols (2007) ﬁnd in a related study that their results ﬁt best with theories in which hospitals
maximize their own output.
5Higher education is an alternative application.
1for a basic service and heterogeneous preferences for additional quality. After
characterizing equilibria under duopoly competition I impose a merger on the
two organizations and compare relative welfare eﬀects for each merger type.
I conﬁrm the standard result that, abstracting from synergies or transaction
cost reductions, mergers between ﬁrms almost always decrease and never increase
welfare. The same is true for mergers between nonproﬁts which are dominated
by owners with mainly ﬁnancial interests (application: a bank taking over control
over a NFP after it failed to repay debt). Mergers between nonproﬁts dominated
by consumers, however, can improve welfare as long as the owners do not have too
exclusive preferences concerning quality (application: care providers controlled by
the family members of their patients). Mergers between worker-dominated non-
proﬁts, in contrast, do not improve welfare (application: nonproﬁt hospitals with
weak board such that senior physicians de facto have control over quality). Merg-
ers between nonproﬁts dominated by donors without any further interest in the
organization are even welfare decreasing (application: purely altruistic owners).
So are mergers between supplier-dominated NFPs (application: foundations be-
ing governed by input suppliers to improve the reputation of the parent company’s
brand, e.g. as a means of showing corporate social responsibility).
These results imply for competition law and regulation that, depending on
the governance structure, “nonproﬁt” might be too crude a label for organiza-
tions with varying goals and, therefore, varying expected behavior after mergers.
Consequently, mergers among nonproﬁt organizations should not necessarily be
treated in the same way as mergers among for-proﬁt ﬁrms. This notion is absent
in current merger guidelines both in the US and the EU.
My work mainly relates to two strands of the literature in economics. First, it
shares a common topic, horizontal mergers, with the classical studies of Salant et
al. (1983), Davidson and Deneckere (1985), Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) and more recent work such as Bian and McFetridge (2000) and
Davidson and Mukherjee (2007), to name just a few. In this literature, the main
questions studied are on the impact of mergers on competition and, ﬁnally, on
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, consumer surplus and total welfare. Conclusions are mainly drawn
for regulators and competition authorities. With the exception of Philipson and
Posner (2006), however, the impact of the organizational form of the merging
parties on those variables of interest is largely ignored.
The second strand of related literature, which is notably less developed,
is on theories of organizational choice between the for-proﬁt and the nonproﬁt
2forms: Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), Kuan (2001), Francois (2003), and Herbst
and Pr¨ ufer (2007) provide formal studies contrasting nonproﬁts and ﬁrms. The
work of Hansmann (1996) oﬀers a very valuable descriptive approach. In this
literature the main questions studied are on the factors which make the nonproﬁt
organizational form more attractive than proﬁt-maximizing alternatives (apart
from tax exemption). These questions are approached from the perspective of
either the owners of the nonproﬁt, i.e. its ﬁnal decision makers, or from an
eﬃciency perspective.
Moreover, I proﬁted from the ideas of Glaeser (2003), who sketches a governance-
based model of nonproﬁts and shows that an improved outside option of one
stakeholder group leads the nonproﬁt manager to specify product characteristics
that are more in line with that group’s preferences. Glaeser does neither consider
competition nor mergers among nonproﬁts though.
The paper most closely related to mine is Philipson and Posner (2006), which
builds on Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006). In those models, the owners of non-
proﬁt organizations prefer increased output. The authors interpret such prefer-
ences as altruism and analyze nonproﬁts as for-proﬁt ﬁrms with lower perceived
costs. Their main result is that, after a merger, nonproﬁt organizations have
the same incentives to reduce output and, hence, to decrease social welfare as
for-proﬁt ﬁrms. This result is based on the assumption that nonproﬁt owners can
exchange proﬁts into own consumption—consequently, they can be expected to
maximize proﬁts. This assumption, however, hurts the nondistribution constraint
(NDC), i.e. the rule that any surplus of a nonproﬁt may not be distributed to its
owners.6 While it is arguable that, in practice, due to imperfect monitoring of
decision makers the NDC is not strictly binding, we can expect an upper thresh-
old for rent extraction because of external monitoring via tax oﬃces, auditors,
or journalists. This is why I model the NDC as the only deﬁning determinant of
an organization as nonproﬁt, just as Bilodeau and Slivinsky (1997) or Francois
(2003). The model of Philipson and Posner could be interpreted as not modeling
nonproﬁts but for-proﬁt producers who may or may not have a preference for
increased output.7 While I replicate their adverse welfare eﬀect when nonproﬁts
6I should note that some other authors also allow nonproﬁts to distribute their proﬁts to
owners, be it directly (Chau and Huysentruyt, 2006) or indirectly via price subsidies (Kuan,
2001) or via non-monetary perks an owner or manager of a nonproﬁt could extract (Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2001).
7Newhouse (1970) assumes that nonproﬁts are subject to a non-distribution constraint and
3dominated by altruists—“pure donors” in my setting—merge, I show that there
are alternative governance structures of NFPs that can make mergers welfare
improving.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next session I describe a model of
duopoly competition with quality-diﬀerentiated goods. In section 3 I establish
benchmark-results for the ﬁrst-best case and competition and mergers between
two FPs. In section 4 I characterize subgame-perfect equilibria for competition
and mergers among consumer-dominated and worker-dominated NFPs and relate
those ﬁndings to cases where NFPs are dominated by suppliers and pure donors.
In section 5 I discuss central technical assumptions, while in section 6 I con-
clude by stating policy implications and suggesting how competition authorities,
regulators, and researchers could use my model. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Demand
There is a mass of 1 consumers. Each consumer i obtains utility from consumption
ui(p,b,q,θi), which is decreasing in the ﬁrst argument and increasing in the others.
p is the uniform price charged for a unit of the product or service. b ≥ 0 is the
exogenous basic utility that providers must produce in order to get a license to
oﬀer their services.8 This reﬂects inelastic unit demand for a service of basic
quality and the existence of a regulator ensuring a minimum quality standard
in the industry. θi is the individual preference for additional quality q, which is
drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [0,1]. Henceforth I will use
the following speciﬁcation of consumer i’s utility function:
u
i(p,b,q,θ
i) = b + θ
iq − p (1)
maximize both output and quality (the former for altruistic reasons, the latter because high
quality might lead to a better prestige of the nonproﬁt and its owners/board members). Rose-
Ackerman (1996) surveys various speciﬁcations of altruistic preferences.
8b could be interpreted as the utility from the contractible part of a products’s quality, e.g.
the number of doctors or the value of medical equipment in a hospital or the ratio of professors
to students in a university. q could then be interpreted as the non-contractible part of quality,
e.g. the eﬀort of doctors or professors invested in their work.
42.2 Supply
There are two organizations j ∈ {A,B} competing for the consumers; market
entry costs of third parties are prohibitive.9 The generic value function that
organizations maximize is:
Vj = ωjπj + (1 − ωj)ψj (2)
where πj denotes monetary proﬁts, ψj denotes some non-monetary utility, and
ωj ∈ {0,1} is the organizational form variable: each organization for which ωj = 0
is a nonproﬁt, while each organization for which ωj = 1 is a (purely) proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrm.10 Owners of the organizations are risk-neutral and have outside
options that give them a value of zero if they do not participate in the market.
Monetary proﬁts are deﬁned as:
πj = pjsj − C(qj)
where sj denotes organization j’s output, which equals its market share if the
market is covered. C(qj) = sjkq2
j are total costs and k ≥ 1 is a measure of the
marginal costs to produce additional quality. I normalize all other costs to zero.11
In FPs, monetary proﬁts may be legally distributed to owners, e.g. via
dividend payments. Hence owners of ﬁrms simply maximize proﬁts independent
of their individual preferences.12 It is not clear in general, however, what kind
9Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that, in a market with quality diﬀerentiated goods, at most
two goods can have a positive market share.
10All organizations for which ωj ∈ (0,1) could be classiﬁed as cooperatives. Those are not
the focus of this paper though. See Herbst and Pr¨ ufer (2007) for more information and a model
comparing ﬁrms, nonproﬁts, and cooperatives.
11This speciﬁcation of costs captures that production of higher quality gets more and more
expensive and that higher quality also increases marginal costs of output. It rules out economies
or diseconomies of scale, which are discussed in some empirical papers on health care markets,
e.g. by Gertler and Waldman (1992), O’Neill and Largey (1997) or Bilodeaux et al. (2000).
However, the results are not clear-cut. Moreover, it is obvious that the introduction of economies
(diseconomies) of scale would beneﬁt (penalize) a single entity over two competitors. Therefore,
assuming economies (diseconomies) of scale would make the case for (against) mergers indepen-
dent of the type of merger even stronger. Because I want to focus on the relative welfare eﬀects
of mergers among nonproﬁts compared to mergers among ﬁrms, I assume the most simple case
of constant returns to scale where marginal and average costs of production are constant.
12Individual owner preferences are unimportant in ﬁrms because dividends can be exchanged
into any type of goods an owner prefers to consume.
5of non-monetary utility owners of nonproﬁts, i.e. the persons holding residual
control in the organization, maximize.
I assume that there is some governance mechanism—or decision-making
rule—in each nonproﬁt by which a pivotal owner is determined among all own-
ers.13 The pivotal owner’s relative preferences for quality of the product versus
monetary income are captured by his type τ ∈ [0,1].14 Assume τ is drawn from a
uniform distribution. I assume the pivotal owner to be part of one of four generic
patron groups in touch with the nonproﬁt: he is either a consumer or a supplier
or a worker or a pure donor.15
First, if the pivotal owner is recruited from the set of consumers, following
Herbst and Pr¨ ufer (2007), I assume that the non-monetary variable which non-
proﬁts maximize is the utility consumers derive from additional quality (hence-
forth: quality). If the pivotal owner is a consumer, he will have preferences τ = θ.
As a ﬁrst side-constraint, when determining product characteristics (i.e. quality,
in the context of my model) I assume that the pivotal owner will make sure that
he is willing to buy the product himself. As a second constraint, nonproﬁts by def-
inition are required to meet a non-distribution constraint, which de facto means
their proﬁts have to be zero. If proﬁts are positive in equilibrium, they have to
be donated to a charity not modeled explicitly.16 Therefore, consumer-dominated
nonproﬁts maximize:17
ψj = qj
s.t. uτ ≥ 0
and πj = 0
Second, if the pivotal owner is a supplier of capital, i.e. a lender, his only
rational interest can be in getting back his monetary investment plus a premium.
Such a lender would not act diﬀerently than the investor of a ﬁrm—while ad-
13Possible decision-making rules comprise majority voting, veto rights for each owner, or
dictatorship, amongst others.
14Here I assume τ to be exogenous. See Herbst and Pr¨ ufer (2007) for endogenization of a
pivotal owner’s preferences in a related setting.
15Note that the pivotal owner does not have to be an oﬃcial owner serving on the NFP board.
I interpret ownership as having de facto, not de jure residual control. See also footnote 19.
16This assumption reﬂects the legal situation in many countries. I assume the charity to be
part of the economy, hence donations are not lost when calculating welfare.
17I discuss objective functions in section 5. An alternative objective function for consumer-
owners is analyzed in Appendix A.10.
6ditionally being constrained by the NDC. Therefore, if a lender has a say in a
nonproﬁt, he will act as a proﬁt maximizer, which is captured by my analysis of
the ﬁrm. If the pivotal owner is a supplier of input goods or services, his inter-
est is either in maximizing the price he can sell his goods for to the nonproﬁt,
which gives him the same objectives as a lender, or he is interested in maximiz-
ing the service quality of the nonproﬁt with respect to suppliers when selling his
inputs. The latter situation can be captured by reinterpreting my model of a
consumer-run nonproﬁt, where the supplier-owner is seen as consumer-owner.18
Third, if the pivotal owner is a worker—or an “elite worker” in the sense of
Glaeser (2003), e.g. a physician in a hospital or a professor in a university—I
assume that he is paid a competitive, exogenous market wage, which I will not
consider further on.19 Therefore, he suﬀers from the production of additional
quality as he is not compensated for it in monetary terms and has to bear C(q).20
However, there is an expected payoﬀ for quality production via increased rep-
utation of the nonproﬁt the pivotal owner is aﬃliated with. Whether an elite
worker’s preferences of quality production with respect to saved eﬀort are posi-
tive or negative, depends on τ ≥ 0.21 Summarizing, worker-dominated nonproﬁts
maximize:22
ψj = τqj − sjkq
2
j
s.t. πj = 0
Finally, the pivotal owner can be a pure donor, i.e. a person who does not
have an interest in consuming the NFP’s services themselves or in supplying it
18In practice, there could be a foundation set up by a ﬁrm to distribute its products to a
market segment not in reach of the ﬁrm’s own quality-price oﬀering. Besides, for instance,
selling the product for a very low price to the poor in a third-world country, the foundation’s
task could be to serve its owner by creating a brand name. This strategy can be interpreted as
a form of corporate social responsibility.
19A worker could either become the pivotal owner by serving on the board of the nonproﬁt or
because monitoring of the oﬃcial owners is too weak. The latter could be the case, for instance,
if the NFP’s founders are not active anymore and the diﬀerence of specialized knowledge of elite
workers and outsiders is substantial. Then elite workers could“consult”the oﬃcial owners what
would be “best”. See Glaeser (2003) for a related approach.
20Assume that non-elite workers can be perfectly monitored by the elite workers and have no
discretion on q.
21Workers with τ > 0 individually value the reputation of their employer generated by high
quality. Workers with τ = 0 have no idiosyncratic valuation of quality.
22See section 5 for a discussion of objectives.
7with inputs or in working there but still donates money.23 Those persons can
be expected to maximize the quality of the nonproﬁt’s service, hence they can
be captured by my model of a consumer-dominated nonproﬁt where the pivotal
owner has a type τ = 1.24
To reproduce the stylized fact that in many organizations ownership and
control are separated and that the interest of the persons with day-to-day control
are not necessarily aligned with the persons holding residual control, I introduce
a manager in each organization. While the owners can determine the long-term
variable, quality, and set up the manager’s employment contract, the manager is
in charge for the short-term variable, price.25 As the focus of this paper is less on
organizational and contractual design but more on organizational choice I assume
that there exists a monitoring technology by which the owners can perfectly check
whether the manager produced the level of quality they told him, or not. They
will only pay his wage if he produces the quality they demanded. Because of
his specialized knowledge on running an organization, however, the manager has
discretion when setting the price. Moreover, I assume that the manager in any
organization can appropriate some perks δ ∈ (0,1) without being detected by
the owners. Perks, as reasoned above, can only be ﬁnanced by monetary surplus.
Hence, the manager maximizes δπ.26
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of my assumptions on NFP
governance.
23Examples for such pure donors are persons who donate to aid organizations being active
in foreign countries or research institutes that produce services the donor himself will never be
directly aﬀected by. Pure donors could become pivotal owners by serving on the board of the
nonproﬁt, for instance.
24Hansmann’s (1996) concept of third-party purchases or, alternatively, the pure altruism in
Francois and Vlassopoulus (2007) capture the spirit of pure donors—in contrast to other donors
who can be consumers, workers or suppliers of a NFP at the same time. Pure donors do not
consume the nonproﬁt’s services themselves but a derivative of it, e.g. a clear conscience when
giving to an organization bringing relief to children in poor countries. Pure donors cannot have
an interest in proﬁt-maximizing of nonproﬁts because proﬁts do not increase the well-being of
the consumers. Instead, they will support if every cent of income is used to increase the quality
of services.
25Since I only use a one-shot game, “long-term” and “short-term” are translated into the
model by letting owners choose quality before the manager determines price.
26This assumption ﬁts both to the idea that managers are interested in empire building as
well as in “enjoying a quiet life”. See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) for a discussion of
managerial preferences in FPs.
8Figure 1: Nonproﬁt governance
Without loss of generality I assume that organization A is the quality leader
and organization B is the quality follower, i.e. the ex ante beliefs of all players
are such that qA > qB.27
2.3 Timing
I want to compare welfare eﬀects of competition among ﬁrms and among non-
proﬁts. Therefore, in a preliminary stage of the game nature chooses whether
competition is between two ﬁrms or between two nonproﬁts. I assume that the
competing organizations are symmetric with respect to their ownership structure,
i.e. the pivotal owners’ preferences are τA = τB. This is to avoid comparing too
many cases and to study“pure”merger cases ﬁrst, where governance structures of
the merging parties are similar ex ante and not a convex combination of diﬀerent
structures.28
27Shaked and Sutton (1982, Lemma 4) show that it is not in the interest of proﬁt-maximizing
sellers to oﬀer the same level of quality as subsequent Bertrand competition on the pricing stage
would erode all proﬁts. Instead both players’ equilibrium prices increase in the quality of the
quality leader.
28Competition among nonproﬁts with diﬀering governance schemes and asymmetric location
of pivotal owners is a fruitful area of future research.
9I assume complete and symmetric information with respect to the endoge-
nous variables throughout the game and solve it for subgame-perfect equilibria.
The exact timing is as follows:29
• t=1: Quality: The pivotal owner of each organization j chooses a level of
quality qj ≥ 0.
• t=2: Price: In each organization a manager picks a price pj for the product,
thereby incurring costs C(qj).
• t=3: Buying: Each consumer learns the ωj’s and the governance structures
of the two organizations in the market, qj, pj and his own θi and may buy
one product.
3 Benchmark analysis
Before I characterize equilibria of competition and mergers among nonproﬁts, I
characterize the ﬁrst-best solution and competition and mergers among ﬁrms as
benchmark cases.
3.1 First-best
















q deﬁnes the marginal consumer for q > 0 who is indiﬀerent between
buying the product and not buying.30
The social planner sets the price equal to marginal costs of production: p =
kq2. Hence, output is s = (1 − θ) = 1 + b
q − kq, which means that demand is
quality sensitive as long as b < kq2. Substituting this into Equation (3) reduces
the social planner’s maximization problem to:
29See section 5 for a discussion of the timing of the game.
30This formulation of welfare uses the fact that the average θi of buying consumers is
1+θ
2 . It
underlines that p > 0 may be used to avoid ineﬃcient consumption but that the social planner’s







2q if b < kq2
b +
q
2 − kq2 if b ≥ kq2
(4)
This expression captures the trade-oﬀ of the welfare maximizer: only a high
quality level will let quality loving consumers (high θi-types) enjoy high utility.
On the other hand, producing a low quality level allows to sell the good for a low
price and therefore increases demand, which is especially good for welfare if the
basic utility b is large. However, if b ≥ kq2, there is no trade-oﬀ anymore because
further quality reduction (and subsequent price reduction) does not increase de-
mand further on.
Lemma 1 (First-best quality, price, and welfare) (i): Consider b ≥ 1
16k: a
welfare-maximizing social planner chooses a quality level of qFB = 1
4k and sells
for pFB = 1
16k to s = 1 consumers. This generates total welfare of WFB = b+ 1
16k.
(ii): Consider b < 1
16k: a welfare-maximizing social planner produces a quality








36k . A share s = 2
3(2 −
√
1 − 12bk) of consumers buys the product, i.e. s ∈ [2









The main intuition of Lemma 1 is that the level of the basic utility b equally
enjoyed by all consumers when they get hold of the product matters a lot. If
b is suﬃciently high, the social planner will ask for a price that makes sure all
consumers can aﬀord the product and thereby enjoy the high basic utility. This
avoids ineﬃcient exclusion at the lower end of the preference-for-quality spectrum.
All revenues are then used to produce additional quality thereby paying some
tribute to quality loving consumers. In contrast, if b is low, it does not pay for
the social planner to sell to all consumers. Consequently, the lower the basic
utility the higher the social planner pushes additional quality (and price), which
drives out more and more consumers.
3.2 Duopoly competition among ﬁrms
I solve the game according to the timing described in section 2.3 by backward-
induction searching for subgame-perfect equilibria. In t = 3 consumers have
to choose which organization to buy from. Consumer i prefers to buy from
11organization A if he cannot increase his net consumption utility by buying from
B, i.e. if b + θiqA − pA ≥ b + θiqB − pB. Solving this expression for the consumer
located at ˆ θ, who is indiﬀerent between buying from A and B and determines the
organizations’ market shares, sA and sB, yields:31
ˆ θ = sB =
pA − pB
qA − qB




All consumers with preferences θi < ˆ θ will buy from organization B, and from
organization A otherwise.
In t = 2 managers determine the prices pA and pB. The manager of organi-






This leads to reaction functions of:
RA : pA(pB) =
qA − qB + pB + kq2
A
2







































Prices of quality diﬀerentiating ﬁrms are strategic complements. The total price
level positively depends on both pivotal owners’ quality decisions, while the mar-
ket share of the quality leader (follower) decreases (increases) in the quality pro-
duced by both ﬁrms and the measure of the marginal cost of quality production, k.
Note that the decisions of the manager do not depend on δ. Hence, the slightest
expectation of being able to appropriate some perks lets the manager maximize
total proﬁts, which is wanted by owners of ﬁrms but not by owners of nonproﬁts.
I substitute equilibrium prices and market shares in the proﬁt functions and













(qA − qB)(k(qA + qB) + 1)
2 (11)
31The proof of Lemma 2 in the appendix shows that, in equilibrium, the market is always
covered. Hence I can use sA = 1 − sB.
12Before stating my results, let us deﬁne producer surplus as PS = πA + πB,









as long as the market is covered, and welfare is W = PS + CS.32
Lemma 2 (Competing ﬁrms) (i): Assume b ≥ 10
27k. In a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium the quality leader, ﬁrm A, produces q∗
A = 2





9 consumers and makes proﬁts of π∗
A = 32
243k. The quality following ﬁrm
B sets q∗




9 consumers and makes proﬁts of π∗
A =
50
243k. Producer surplus is PSFF = 82
243k and consumer surplus is CSFF = b− 74
243k,
which adds to welfare of WFF = b + 8
243k.
(ii): Assume b < 10
27k. In a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium ﬁrm B produces
q∗
B = 0 and sells for p∗
B = b
2. There is no closed-form solution for q∗
A. Consumer
surplus, producer surplus and welfare, depending on q∗
A, are given by Equations
(31) to (33).
Lemma 2.(i) shows that, if the basic consumption utility b is suﬃciently high
such that competitive forces make sure the market is always covered, ﬁrm A
produces a very high quality (compared to qFB) while ﬁrm B maximizes product
diﬀerentiation by producing no additional quality at all. Because of the high
ﬁxed consumption utility b all consumers buy a product, despite the fact that
prices are very high relative to pFB. As equilibrium values do not depend on b, it
is competitive forces that contain the ﬁrms from exploiting consumers when the
basic utility increases. Interestingly, π∗
B > π∗
A: B sells to more consumers and
bears no cost of quality production. Consequently, B’s proﬁts exceed A’s.
If b is suﬃciently low, ﬁrm B has to react to avoid losing customers. Lemma
2.(ii) indicates that B does that by radically cutting prices to b
2, which makes
sure the market is completely covered in this case too. Firm A reacts by cutting
its own quality qA and its price pA accordingly.
3.3 Mergers between two ﬁrms
Now let the ﬁrms merge and form a monopoly in the market. I do not assume
that there is a special reason, such as expected synergies, for a merger because
my focus is on the relative welfare eﬀects of mergers among nonproﬁts compared
to mergers among ﬁrms. Therefore, the subsequent analysis could come on top
32This formulation of consumer surplus already uses the fact that the average θi of B’s clients
is sB
2 and the average θi of A’s clients is 1+sB
2 .
13of a traditional merger analysis that focuses on other merger aspects than the
organizational form of the parties involved.33
Just as a social planner a monopolistic ﬁrm faces consumer demand of s =
(1 − θ) =
q+b−p
q , for q > 0. In contrast to a social planner, the ﬁrm’s manager





(b + q + kq
2); s
∗ =
b + q − kq2
2q
(12)
Substituting (12) in the objective function of the ﬁrm’s owners and incurring
that demand is quality sensitive as long as b < kq2 +q reduces the maximization







4q if b < kq2 + q
b if b ≥ kq2 + q
(13)
Before I state Lemma 3, note that Equation (13) shares some commonalities with
(4), the maximization problem of the social planner: both are monopolists, but
monopolistic pricing of the ﬁrm, compared to marginal cost pricing of the social
planner, increases the boundary of b above which sales are not price sensitive,
anymore. This is reﬂected in the second line of (13): if s = 1, the manager
will ask for the maximum price that all consumers are willing to pay: p∗ = b.
Consequently, in this case there is no reason for proﬁt maximizing owners to
increase additional quality above zero. As long as owners expect s < 1—cf. the
ﬁrst lines of (13) and (4)—the proﬁt the ﬁrm maximizes is exactly half of the
welfare a social planner maximizes.
Lemma 3 (Monopolistic ﬁrm) (i): Consider b ≥ 1
16k: a monopolistic ﬁrm
will choose a quality level of q∗
F = 0, ask for p∗
F = b, sell to s = 1 consumers and
yield producer surplus of PSF = b, consumer surplus of CSF = 0, and welfare of
WF = b.
(ii): Consider b < 1














3 consumers; i.e. s ∈ [1
3, 1
2]
33See the literature review in the introduction section for some references on mergers among
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
14for b ∈ [0, 1
16k]. Producer surplus, consumer surplus and welfare are given by:
PSF =























Without a quantity eﬀect of further quality growth, i.e. where b ≥ 1
16k, the
monopolistic ﬁrm will completely exploit consumers by not providing additional
quality at all and charging the homogenous basic willingness-to-pay to consumers.
This results in a welfare loss compared both to the ﬁrst-best and competition
among ﬁrms. For low levels of basic quality and low costs of additional quality
(b < 1
16k), the monopolistic ﬁrm even produces qF = qFB. Because of its high
pricing, however, it sells only to half of the consumers a social planner sells to
and generates a welfare of WF = 3
4WFB.
Proposition 1 (Merging Firms) (i): Consider b = 0: In competition, one
ﬁrm produces no additional quality (q∗
B = 0), the other ﬁrm produces q∗
A = 1
3k =
qF, the quality of the monopolistic ﬁrm. Under both regimes consumer surplus
(CS = 1
54k) and total welfare (W = 1
18k) are equal.
(ii): Consider b > 0: competing ﬁrms generate total welfare that is larger than
welfare generated by a monopolistic ﬁrm.
This Proposition, implying that mergers among proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms that
compete in a duopoly never increase welfare, is a standard result in the mergers
literature. The intuition is that competition contains ﬁrms from exploiting con-
sumers. If they merge, their market power increases—here the monopolist seizes
to produce additional quality as soon as the basic utility is suﬃciently large—and
consumers suﬀer more than the merged ﬁrm wins.
4 Nonproﬁts
I now analyze my core subject of interest, competition and mergers among non-
proﬁts. Following section 2.2 I distinguish among nonproﬁts dominated by con-
sumers, workers, suppliers, and pure donors. For reasons outlined above I only
15have to characterize equilibria explicitly for consumer-run and worker-run non-
proﬁts.
4.1 Competition among consumer-dominated nonproﬁts
Since managers, by assumption, behave similarly irrespective of the organization
they work for, in line with ex ante beliefs Equations (8) and (9) show Nash
equilibrium prices in t = 2 and market shares in t = 3 when two nonproﬁts
compete with each other. (10) and (11) depict corresponding proﬁt functions.




s.t. uτ ≥ 0 (18)
and πj = 0 (19)
This program implies that a pivotal owner with preferences τA = τB = θ will
choose the maximum quality level that leads to zero proﬁts and makes sure that
he is willing to buy the product himself.
Lemma 4 (Competing consumer-dominated nonproﬁts) (i): There is no
subgame-perfect equilibrium with diﬀerentiated qualities, in which the non-distribution
constraint is binding. In equilibrium both nonproﬁts produce the same levels of
quality.
(ii): Depending on the preferences of the pivotal owners, symmetric consumer-
dominated nonproﬁts produce qA = qB = τ+
√
4bk+τ2
2k ≡ qCNN. Each manager asks





4k ≡ pCNN and sells to sA = sB = 1−τ
2 con-
sumers, thereby making proﬁts and producer surplus of πA = πB = 0 = PSCNN.





Lemma 4.(i) shows that the only way for consumer-owners to produce zero
proﬁts and to contain their perk-seeking managers from asking monopoly prices
is to tell them to produce the same quality level and, consequently, let them face
Bertrand price competition in t = 2. This result extends Shaked and Sutton
(1982, p.7), who show in their seminal paper on monopolistic competition with
quality diﬀerentiated products that in Nash equilibrium proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms
16never produce the same level of quality—for the very reason to avoid Bertrand
price competition.
Lemma 4.(ii) builds on the fact that this strategy of the pivotal owners leads
to eﬃcient marginal cost pricing. The “participation constraints” of the pivotal
owners (18) make sure that quality is not excessively increased and all consumers
with preferences of θi ≥ τ buy the product.34 As τ is not only the pivotal owner
but also the marginal buyer in this setting, the model could be interpreted as
either using the unanimity decision-rule in a consumer-dominated nonproﬁt if the
preferences of the lowest-ranking member are at τ = τ. Alternatively, the model
captures the majority voting rule (median owner decides), if the preferences of
the lowest ranking member are at τ = 2τ −1. Finally, recall that the preferences
of the pivotal owner in for-proﬁt ﬁrms, in contrast to nonproﬁts, have no inﬂuence
on ﬁrms’ behavior.
4.2 Mergers between two consumer-dominated nonproﬁts
If two nonproﬁts merge and the market structure changes from duopoly compe-
tition to monopoly, due to a perk-seeking manager the situation in t = 2 and
t = 3 resembles the one under a for-proﬁt monopoly, which is captured by (12).
The consumer-dominated nonproﬁt monopolist’s pivotal owner, however, solves
the same optimization program as given in Equations (17) to (19).
Lemma 5 (Monopolistic consumer-dominated nonproﬁt) (i): Any qual-
ity level that leads to positive sales also leads to positive proﬁts. The non-
distribution constraint requires that those proﬁts are donated to a charity.









and sells to s = 1−τ consumers. Producer surplus, consumer surplus and welfare
are given by Equations (41) to (43).
(iii): Consider b = 0: if τ > 1
2, then qCN = 2τ−1
k , pCN = 4τ2−2τ
2k , which leads








2, then qCN = 0, pCN = b, s = 1, PSCN = b, CSCN = 0, WCN = b.
34Without the second constraint, Equation (18), owners would then drive up quality (and
prices) more and more, until no consumer could aﬀord to buy the product anymore. If s = 0,
then PS = CS = W = 0.
17Due to the absence of a competitor, monopoly pricing of the nonproﬁt’s
manager cannot be avoided by its owners. Therefore, as long as the pivotal owner
does not increase quality to a level that no consumer can aﬀord anymore, the
manager is always able to generate positive proﬁts, as long as b > 0. Lemma 5.(i)
establishes that my previous interpretation of the non-distribution constraint,
as a zero-proﬁt condition, cannot be upheld; this does not create a conceptual
problem because the owners cannot extract monetary proﬁts if those are donated
to a charity.
Lemma 5.(ii) characterizes the result if consumers attach some positive basic
utility to the product, where, intuitively, the quality produced increases in the
preference for quality of the pivotal owner. Lemma 5.(iii) shows the interesting
insight that, given there is no basic utility and the pivotal owner’s preferences
for quality are low, a monopolistic consumer-dominated nonproﬁt would produce
no additional quality at all—and thereby generate a welfare of zero. This is
due to the manager’s monopoly pricing, which avoids that such a low-quality
preferring owner could aﬀord any product with q > 0. Only if his preference
for quality is suﬃciently high (τ > 1
2), positive quality is produced and positive
welfare generated. Finally note that in this case, just as under a monopolistic
ﬁrm, producer surplus doubles the size of consumer surplus.
Proposition 2 (Merging consumer-dominated nonproﬁts) (i): Consider
b = 0 ∧ τ ≤ .6: in this range I have qCN < qCNN and WCN < WCNN.
(ii): Consider b = 0 ∧ τ ≥ .6: in this range qCN < qCNN but WCN ≥ WCNN.
(iii): Consider b > 0: in this range qCN < qCNN and pCN < pCNN. For some τ,
WCN − WCNN > 0, for some τ, otherwise.
This Proposition is fundamental for my entire study. It shows that, for
some parameter values of the pivotal owners’ preferences, a merger between two
competing consumer-dominated nonproﬁts can increase welfare. To better un-
derstand this result I plotted equilibrium quality levels in Figure 2.
Independent of b or τ, competing consumer-run nonproﬁts produce higher
quality than a monopolist: qCN < qCNN. This is intuitive as the monopolistic
manager maximizes his perks, and hence proﬁts, which means that he will produce
less quality for a given market price. Competitive nonproﬁts, in contrast, face
Bertrand competition and sell for marginal costs. Therefore, they can aﬀord to
produce higher quality for a given price.
18Figure 2: Equilibrium quality levels of consumer-dominated nonproﬁts depend-
ing on the pivotal owner’s preference for quality τ ∈ [0,1]. [LEFT]: k = 1,
b = 1
32 < 1
16: the horizontal line at .3 depicts the ﬁrst-best quality, the lower
curve the monopolist’s quality qCN, the higher curve the competitive quality
qCNN. [RIGHT]: k = 1, b = 1
3 > 1
16; the horizontal line at .25 depicts the ﬁrst-
best quality, the lower curve the monopolist’s quality qCN, the higher curve the
competitive quality qCNN.
Now it is enlightening to compare quality levels produced in the market with
the ﬁrst-best level, which is shown in Figure 2. If b is low (left panel) and τ is not
too large, the competitive quality qCNN is closer to qFB than the monopolistic
quality qCN. As τ is of intermediate size, however, qCN even intersects qFB,
which makes the monopolist more welfare enhancing than the competitors, who
overinvest in quality. Only as τ gets very large, qCN still is closer to qFB than
qCNN, but monopolistic pricing of the manager makes the monopolistic case less
eﬃcient. Moreover, if b is large (right panel of Figure 2), qCN is closer to qFB for
all τ, which results in higher welfare if duopolists merge as competing nonproﬁts
heavily overinvest in quality. Only if τ is very high—and qCN gets close to qCNN—
monopolistic pricing of the manager ruins the relative eﬃciency of monopolistic
consumer-run nonproﬁts. Notice that pCN < pCNN ∀ τ ∈ (0,1), i.e. the
absolute price level is lower under monopoly than under duopoly.
4.3 Competition among worker-dominated nonproﬁts
In accordance with section 2.2, if a nonproﬁt’s de facto control rests with an
elite worker who has to exert eﬀort to produce quality, that pivotal owner will
choose q to maximize his net utility from quality production, which depends on
19his reputation gains and the cost to produce the quality:
ψj = τqj − sjkq
2
j (20)
s.t. πj = 0 (21)
The managers of A and B face the same situation as in competition among
consumer-dominated nonproﬁts (see section 4.1). Hence, Lemma 4.(i) holds.
Resulting Bertrand price competition leads to marginal cost pricing, i.e. pA =
pB = kq2 and πA = πB = 0. This simpliﬁes the decision-problem of the pivotal





Given my assumption, that τA = τB = τ, there is a unique solution.
Lemma 6 (Competing worker-dominated nonproﬁts) (i): Consider τ =
0: in equilibrium both nonproﬁts produce: qA = qB = 0 ≡ qWNN = pWNN,
sA = sB = 1
2, PSWNN = 0, CSWNN = b = WWNN.
(ii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b ≥ τ2
4k: the subgame-perfect equilibrium is character-
ized by qA = qB = τ
2k = qWNN, pA = pB = pWNN = τ2
4k and sA = sB = 1
2. Hence
PSWNN = 0, CSWNN = 4bk+τ−τ2
4k = WWNN.
(iii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b < τ2
4k: the subgame-perfect equilibrium is character-









4k and sA = sB = 0. Consequently, PSWNN = 0 = CSWNN =
WWNN.
Lemma 6 underlines that the pivotal owner’s preferences for quality and the
intensity of competition mainly determine the market outcome. As competition
is most intense, due to the lack of product diﬀerentiation in equilibrium, prices
equal marginal costs and proﬁts are zero. Lemma 6.(i) captures the situation
when the pivotal elite worker is unwilling to invest in quality without getting
monetary remuneration for it, e.g. because he is lazy or reputational concerns do
not play a role in his perspective. He would exert no eﬀort to produce additional
quality.
Lemma 6.(ii) captures the situation when the pivotal elite worker is moti-
vated to produce additional quality but knows, due to the high basic utility of
the product and the marginal cost pricing, that all consumers will buy anyway.
He will then increase additional quality in line with his own preferences. If his
20preferences are the average of the entire population, τ = 1
2, this case can even
reach ﬁrst-best welfare.
Lemma 6.(iii) captures another extreme case. If the basic utility is low,
consumers are sensitive to changes in quality and, subsequently, price levels. The
optimal response of a quality-loving elite worker—independent of his exact level
of preferences τ—is then to produce the maximum quality level feasible, at which
no consumer can aﬀord the product. He would get all the reputation/utility
of the high quality but he would not have to bear the costs of production.35
Unfortunately, this comes at the expense of welfare, de facto creating the worst
welfare outcome of zero.
4.4 Mergers between two worker-dominated nonproﬁts
In a monopolistic worker-dominated nonproﬁt the manager will set the monopoly
price and consumers will react accordingly as captured in Equation (12). Sub-
stituting this in the objective function of the pivotal owner and incurring that
demand is elastic as long as b < kq2 + q reduces the maximization problem in








2q kq2 if b < kq2 + q
τq − kq2 if b ≥ kq2 + q
(23)
s.t. πj = 0 (24)
Lemma 7 (Monopolistic worker-dominated nonproﬁt) (i): Consider τ =
0: the nonproﬁt produces qWN = 0 and asks for pWN = b. It sells to sWN = 1
consumers, creating PSWN = b, CSWN = 0, and WWN = b.
(ii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b ≥
τ(2+τ)
4k : the subgame-perfect equilibrium is charac-
terized by qWN = τ
2k, pWN = b and sWN = 1, leading to PSWN = b − τ2
4k, which
is donated to a charity. CSWN = τ
4k and WWN = b + τ−τ2
4k .
(iii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b <
τ(2+τ)
4k : the subgame-perfect equilibrium is character-









sWN = 0. Consequently, PSWN = 0 = CSWN = WWN.
35In practice, this scenario captures a situation where, for instance, physicians in a nonproﬁt
hospital invest a lot in their own education and training and hence are able to perform very
complicated surgeries. This brings them reputation and respect from their colleagues in other
hospitals but patients cannot aﬀord to pay for such high-skilled labor anymore.
21Due to the formal similarity of Lemmas 6 and 7 I directly proceed to:
Proposition 3 (Merging worker-dominated nonproﬁts) (i): Consider b <
τ2
4k ∨ b ≥
τ(2+τ)
4k ∨ τ = 0: quality levels and welfare generated by worker-
dominated duopolists and a worker-dominated monopolist are equal: qWNN =
qWN, WWNN = WWN .
(ii): Consider b ∈ [τ2
4k,
τ(2+τ)
4k ) ∧ τ > 0: competitive worker-run nonprof-
its produce lower quality and generate higher welfare than such monopolists:
qWNN < qWN, WWNN > WWN.
This Proposition requires no formal proof but easily follows from the two
previous Lemmas on worker-dominated nonproﬁts. Lemma 7.(i) follows from
the same logic as Lemma 6.(i): if the pivotal elite worker has no preference for
additional quality, he will not produce it. The diﬀerence between the two results
is that, in case of a monopolistic worker-dominated nonproﬁt, the manager’s
power to set the price to the monopoly level is not constrained by competition.
Consequently, consumer surplus of the competition case is shifted to the producer
in the monopoly case—who then due to the non-distribution constraint has to
donate the proﬁts to a charity. This shift, however, does not aﬀect the welfare
result.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 7 compare well to parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma
6: if the pivotal elite worker has a preference for quality and if complete market
coverage, due to high basic utility b, is secured, he picks a quality level which
is rising in line with his quality preference. If demand is elastic with respect to
quality changes, however, the pivotal owner chooses the maximum quality level
feasible such that his utility from quality production is maximized but costs, due
to the inability of consumers to aﬀord the high-quality product, are minimized.
There are two notable diﬀerences between Lemmas 6 and 7: ﬁrst, in parts
(ii), as in parts (i), by asking for a higher price the monopolistic manager shifts
surplus from consumers to the producer. As demand is inelastic in these ranges
the shift does not aﬀect welfare though. Second, more importantly the boundary
between parts (ii) and (iii) is diﬀerent—which is the origin of Proposition 3.(ii).
While in the competition case demand is quality inelastic for b ≥ τ2
4k, the same
is true in the monopolistic case only for b ≥
τ(2+τ)
4k > τ2
4k. This means that,
for intermediate levels of b, the overinvestment in quality of competing worker-
dominated nonproﬁts is lower than the overinvestment of monopolists, leading to
higher welfare in the competitive case.
224.5 Nonproﬁts dominated by suppliers and pure donors
Before I state my main result, let me brieﬂy discuss the cases of nonproﬁts dom-
inated by suppliers and by pure donors.
I argued in section 2.2 that the only rational interest of a supplier of capital
(a lender) to a nonproﬁt due to the non-distribution constraint can be in max-
imizing the secure repayment of his loan. This security would be maximized if,
given the absence of market risk in my model, the nonproﬁt’s monetary income
was maximized. Then the lender could be sure to get back loan and interest.
Consequently, such a supplier would lead a nonproﬁt just as a proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrm. In equilibrium, Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 1 apply, subject to the
constraint that proﬁts have to be donated to a charity. This means that merg-
ers between two nonproﬁts dominated by lenders with purely ﬁnancial interests
nearly always decrease and never increase welfare.
I also argued in section 2.2 that a supplier of input goods or services could
either be regarded as maximizing the price he can sell his goods for to the non-
proﬁt, which gives him the same objectives as a lender. Alternatively, he could
be interested in maximizing the service quality of the nonproﬁt with respect to
suppliers when selling his inputs. My model of consumer-dominated nonproﬁts
would capture this case, where the supplier-owner is seen as consumer-owner of
the nonproﬁt. Consequently, Lemmas 4 and 5 and Proposition 2 would apply.
Such a merger, depending on the preferences of the pivotal owners τ and the
basic utility b, could be welfare enhancing.
If the pivotal owner is a pure donor, I argued that he must be interested
in maximizing the quality of the nonproﬁt’s services. My model of a consumer-
dominated nonproﬁt captures this set-up. Subgame-perfect equilibria are char-
acterized by Lemmas 4 and 5, where τ = 1. With reference to Proposition 2 I
conclude that mergers between two nonproﬁts dominated by pure donors always
decrease welfare (irrespective of b).
I summarize my ﬁndings in the main result:
Proposition 4 (Comparing merger cases) (i): Mergers between two com-
petitors whose pivotal owners have purely ﬁnancial interests, independently whether
ex ante they are incorporated as ﬁrms or nonproﬁts, never increase but mostly
decrease welfare.
(ii): Mergers between nonproﬁts whose pivotal owners have an interest in the
consumption of the organizations’ goods or services, independently whether they
23are consumers of the NFP’s product or obtain non-monetary utility from its ser-
vices as suppliers, can increase welfare.
(iii): Mergers between nonproﬁts whose pivotal owners are elite workers and
therefore could have a non-monetary interest in producing quality, are never wel-
fare enhancing but can decrease welfare.
(iv): Mergers between two nonproﬁts whose pivotal owners are pure donors striv-
ing to maximize product quality always decrease welfare.
It is crucial to understand the diﬀerent sources of merger ineﬃciency cap-
tured in Proposition 4. Part (i) is obvious because merging proﬁt-maximizers use
their increased market-power to exploit consumers and fail to oﬀer suﬃciently
high quality for the high price they charge.
In part (iii) the source of ineﬃciency is completely diﬀerent: nonproﬁts dom-
inated by workers who suﬀer from the production of additional quality if they sell
a lot, on the one hand, but beneﬁt from high quality independently of output,
on the other hand, have a tendency to heavily overinvest in quality. Then their
services are priced prohibitively for (nearly) all consumers, thereby reducing the
disutility attached to output, but they can still collect high utility, e.g. from
reputation among colleagues. Mergers among such organizations, by reducing
competition, allow the pivotal workers in more states of the world to live out
their private obsessions. This behavior has detrimental eﬀects on welfare.
The mechanism behind Proposition 4.(ii) is that consumer-dominated non-
proﬁts, just as worker-dominated nonproﬁts, focus on the production of quality.
While the latter try to avoid selling to many consumers, in contrast, consumer-
dominated NFPs make sure they can aﬀord to buy the product produced and,
therefore, invest less in quality than worker-dominated NFPs. Tough competition
between two consumer-run nonproﬁts erodes this quality containment. This is
why, as long as the quality preference of the pivotal owner is not too high, merg-
ers relaxing tough competition and decreasing quality produced can be welfare
enhancing.
The latter eﬀect is not applicable to mergers among NFPs dominated by pure
donors because those players heavily invest in quality such that mergers virtually
do not decrease overinvestment but only have the negative eﬀect of increasing
prices.
245 Discussion
Timing of the game: Why are q and p set at diﬀerent stages of the game? I
assume C(q) to be a per-period cost for personnel and special technical equipment,
both with a certain education or quality. Hence q cannot be adjusted at short
notice. Contrarily, prices can be adjusted easily. Thus they should be chosen at
an own stage and after quality determination.
Separation of ownership and control: Why did I introduce a manager to
carry out day-to-day business and to decide p? Why do the owners not determine
both q and p themselves? Let us consider the most interesting case, consumer-
dominated NFPs, and decide q and p together! The pivotal owner maximizing q
s.t. uτ ≥ 0 would set p = MC = kq2 allowing him to produce the high level of
quality depicted in Lemma 4. This would happen independently of the degree of
competition. In other words, such a mighty pivotal owner would act in the same
way not regarding the competitive environment he operates in. Consequently,
mergers would have no eﬀect on his behavior.
In contrast, empirical studies show that the degree of competition inﬂuences
behavior in NFPs (see Malani et al. (2003)). Separation of ownership and con-
trol is a ubiquitous fact in all types of organizations in reality. This is true,
in particular, in industries where very specialized knowledge of the production
technology (reﬂecting owners’ decisions on q) is needed in line with specialized
business knowledge (reﬂecting the manager’s decision on p in my model).36 More-
over, I assume separation of ownership and control because cost components in
an organization are numerous, ﬂuctuating, and consequently hard to evaluate for
an outsider. Owners might only observe and evaluate the organization’s budget
after production and sales. With some discretion on costs, a manager could then
always justify a monopolistic price level via budget break-even.37
Despite this business ignorance of owners, I assume that they set q and know
the reaction function of the manager and, hence, indirectly also determine p(q).
More realistically, this could be interpreted in a way such that owners cannot
foresee p(q) exactly but believe in some distribution function of possible reaction
36These characteristics ﬁt very well to health care, where expertise in both medical science
and management can rarely be found together.
37In this case there would be little or no positive proﬁts that have to be transferred to a
charity by the NFP. My welfare analysis above is robust to this notion because the rent of the
manager from enjoying perks would be included in the welfare summation.
25functions of the manager. p(q) would then be the expectation of that distribution
function.
Managerial objectives: If the manager can determine p, why should he choose
to maximize proﬁts even in a nonproﬁt? This is rational because I assume that
owners can observe the level of quality before they pay the manager—potentially
by spending on an external auditor or some other monitoring mechanism speciﬁed
outside of the game—the manager cannot shirk on q. The only way to create
some rents for himself is then to maximize the sum of proﬁts and to spend some
income on his perks. Alternatively, following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)
who suggest that managers prefer to spend less eﬀort on hard work instead of
building empires, I could interpret that the signal owners obtain on the quality
level actually produced by the manager is stochastic. Owners’ uncertainty then
would be similar across organizations though. Hence after reducing quality a bit,
managers in all organizations would have to maximize their own utility similarly,
by maximizing perks, the scope for which increases with proﬁts.
Consumer-owner objectives: Why should the pivotal owner in the case of a
consumer-dominated NFP maximize quality and only make sure he can buy the
product himself? An obvious alternative to this approach, letting a consumer-
owner maximize his own utility (uτ), also leads to overproduction of quality for
some τ, which is reduced by a merger. The qualitative result of Proposition 2, that
a merger between two consumer-dominated NFPs can increase welfare, holds.38
The conceptual problem with assuming (uτ) as the pivotal owner’s objective
function is that it hurts the spirit of the nondistribution constraint: the owner
could always save on quality to reduce the price and have more monetary funds
to spend on consumption of other goods. Economically, this is not diﬀerent from
having the right to pay out dividends to owners and against the fundamental
idea of the nondistribution constraint: to separate control and income rights.
Such an organization would be a cooperative, not a nonproﬁt (see Herbst and
Pr¨ ufer (2007)). In contrast, the objective function I use avoids this problem
as the pivotal consumer independently of the realization of τ ends up with a
constant utility level (zero). The objective function makes sure he does not face
the trade-oﬀ between monetary and non-monetary utility when deciding q.
The main result could only be hurt, if the pivotal consumer-owner were
not to maximize some variable with respect to his individual preferences but to
38See Appendix A.10 for a proof.
26maximize consumer surplus as a whole. That would result in behavior similar to
that of the welfare-maximizing social planner—an approach I explicitly want to
avoid as I do not assume a cooperative game among owners, in which utility is
perfectly transferable.
Worker-owner objectives: Without loss of generality I assume that the piv-
otal owner in a NFP dominated by elite workers has to bear the entire cost of
quality production and cannot share it with his fellow elite workers. If he could
share the cost with his (n − 1) fellow workers, I would have to rewrite (20) as
ψj = τqj −
sjkq2
j
n . This would not change the quality of subsequent results. Fur-
thermore, to rationalize the decision-making process among the elite workers, I
have implicitly assumed that there is a direct link between the quality level of the
individual worker, which is relevant for the eﬀort cost (sjkq2
j) of that worker, and
the average quality level ¯ q exerted by all elite workers creating the reputation
of the organization and, hence, utility τ¯ q for the individual. This assumption
holds most easily if the number of elite workers is small. Then, observability of
quality creating inputs among colleagues is highest and free-riding on the eﬀort
of colleagues is lowest because of informal pressure or peer eﬀects.
Endogenous mergers: I have assumed that mergers take place because of
reasons exogenous to the model. This is because, ﬁrst, the analysis suggested
here can come on top of any traditional merger analysis and I aspire to isolate the
eﬀects of organizational form of the merging parties on welfare. Hence there could
always be exogenous reasons, e.g. economies of scale, which motivate the owners
to agree to a merger. Second, if two consumer-dominated NFPs merge, I showed
that the pivotal owners’ utility before and after a merger equals zero. Thus they
should be indiﬀerent between merging and not merging. In reality, managers can
be a driving force in merger procedures. Their motivation is reﬂected in my model
as the increased market power of managers via a merger results in higher proﬁts
and, hence, in higher perks for managers. Then, if I assume that managers have
at least marginal inﬂuence on the merger decision, mergers are well motivated in
my model.
More than two suppliers: As my model is the ﬁrst to combine competition in
a quality and a price dimension with mergers of various organizational forms, I
leave the analytical details of mergers in markets with more than two suppliers
for future research. The intuition of the most interesting result, that welfare can
increase when merging NFPs are dominated by consumers, can be generalized
as long as the market power of the manager increases in the course of a merger.
27Then he could increase the price, which would lead to a decrease in quality.
Overproduction of quality would be diminished, which in some cases would lead
to the welfare gain mentioned in Proposition 2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have investigated the relative welfare eﬀects of mergers among
nonproﬁts compared to mergers among for-proﬁt ﬁrms. I have approached my
main question, whether mergers among nonproﬁts should be regulated diﬀer-
ently than mergers among ﬁrms, by constructing a model of duopoly competition
which accounts for the diﬀerent governance structures of nonproﬁts dominated
by consumers, workers, suppliers, and pure donors.
I have conﬁrmed the standard result that, abstracting from synergies or
transaction cost reductions, mergers between ﬁrms almost always decrease and
never increase welfare. The same is true for mergers between nonproﬁts which are
dominated by owners with mainly ﬁnancial interests. Mergers between nonproﬁts
dominated by consumers, however, can improve welfare as long as the owners
do not have preferences for too high quality. This is the main result of my
paper standing in contrast to the claim of Philipson and Posner (2006), that
the same incentives to restrain trade exist in NFPs as in FPs irrespective of the
organizations’ ownership structures. My main policy implication follows, that
mergers between consumer-dominated NFPs should be treated more benevolent
than mergers among other organizations, in particular proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms –
a notion that is absent in current merger guidelines both in the US and the EU.
Although related to consumer-dominated nonproﬁts, mergers between two NFPs
dominated by elite workers or by pure donors do not improve welfare and, hence,
should not get special treatment from competition law authorities, regulators,
and legislators.
The mechanism creating the most interesting result of this paper, on consumer-
dominated NFPs, is based upon two key features. First, it stems from the assump-
tion that consumers value quality highly, which induces some owners to target
a level of quality that exceeds the ﬁrst-best level. Second, the mechanism de-
pends on the separation of ownership and control, which gives the manager, who
is assumed to have diﬀerent personal objectives than the pivotal owner, some
discretion when determining the price. The consequences of this lack of goal
28alignment are mitigated as long as competition disciplines the manager where
owners cannot. This mitigation, however, makes the overproduction of quality
targeted by some owners, who do not care about their fellow owners’ well-being,
realizable. Relaxing the disciplining forces of competition can give the manager
enough discretion to increase the price, which lets the pivotal consumer-owner
decrease quality because he cannot aﬀord to buy the product himself otherwise.
In some cases, the eﬃciency gain from the reduction of too high quality exceeds
the eﬃciency loss from monopoly pricing. Then mergers are welfare improving.
Finally, note that this mechanism does not apply to all cases where the
pivotal owner values high quality: NFPs dominated by pure-donors, for instance,
overproduce quality under the duopoly and monopoly regimes in an equal manner.
In the latter case, the extra eﬃciency loss of monopoly pricing just comes on top
of too much quality making such mergers unambiguously welfare decreasing.
The potential applicability of my framework is twofold: if the background—
and hence the most likely objectives—of two NFPs’ owners aspiring to merge is
known or can be inferred rather precisely, my model generates predictions on the
merged party’s behavior and the welfare eﬀects of the merger. This method can
also be used with existing data to test the validity of my model.
Contrarily, if owners’ preferences cannot be revealed, a merger was already
settled and some data—namely on quality, prices and output—could be obtained,
the de facto governance structure could be concluded by using my framework.
Vita and Sacher (2001), to pick one example, analyze the case study of a merger
between two nonproﬁt hospitals. They ﬁnd, on the one hand, that the transac-
tion was followed by signiﬁcant price increases. However, those authors reject the
hypothesis that the price increases completely reﬂect higher post-merger quality.
The changes induced by the merger—increasing prices but constant quality—ﬁt
well to the move from Lemma 6.(ii) to Lemma 7.(ii). Consequently, my model sug-
gests that the case studied by Vita and Sacher concerned two worker-dominated
nonproﬁts.
With this study I want to raise awareness for the conjecture that nonproﬁt
might not equal nonproﬁt. Maybe the empirical literature on nonproﬁts is only
inconclusive and controversial because the label“nonproﬁt”serves as a melting pot
of various organizational forms whose owners in fact have very diﬀerent objectives
and, consequently, can be expected to behave diﬀerently in several situations, for
instance in mergers.
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A Appendix
Within the subsequent proofs, when searching for the equilibrium quality level
produced by the pivotal owner in t = 1, I have to distinguish between two com-
petitive settings in t = 2: if a manager prices according to marginal cost, p = kq2,
the quality decision in t = 1 ﬁnally aﬀects consumer demand—there is a quantity






2k ). Below that range, i.e. where b ≥ kq2, all con-
sumers buy: s = 1. Above that range, i.e. where b ≤ kq2 −q, no consumer buys:
s = 0.
If a manager sets the monopoly price, p = 1
2(b+q+kq2), the quality decision







that range, i.e. where b ≥ kq2 + q, all consumers buy: s = 1. Above that range,







k for b > 0.
32A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i): The second line of (4) has a straightforward solution, qFB = 1
4k, which is
valid if b ≥ kq2 = 1
16k and leads to pFB = 1
16k, s = 1 and a welfare of W = b+ 1
16k.
(ii): There are four FOCs of
(b+q−kq2)2










6k : the second-order condition (SOC) is positive. Hence, here










6k : SOC is negative; hence there is a welfare maximum, which
exists ∀ b ≤ 1
12k. As the case in (4) requires a stronger condition, b < 1
16k




















Note that both cases (i) and (ii) converge at b = 1
16k, where qFB = 1
4k,
pFB = 1
16k, s = 1, and WFB = 1
8k.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i): If b ≥ 10
27k, the budget constraints of all consumers hold, i.e. the market is
always covered for competitive prices. In this case, the FOCs of Equations (10)













The optimal quality for B is q∗
B = 0, a corner solution. Because consumers
could not aﬀord to buy qA = 2
k, A’s best response to this is q∗
A = 2
3k. Both
strategies form a Nash equilibrium. The remaining results in Lemma 2.(i) follow
by substitution of q∗
A and q∗
B. Note that the cheapest version of the product
available to the consumer at θi = 0 is B’s product, the consumption of which
gives him a utility of b − 10
27k ≥ 0 ∀ b ≥ 10
27k.
(ii): If b < 10
27k, the market is not necessarily covered. sA = 1 −
pA−pB
qA−qB




qB . This is
































(qA − qB)(b − qA(−2 + k(qB + 2qA)))(2b − qA(−2 + k(qB + 2qA)))




(qA − qB)qA(2b + qB(1 + k(−qB + qA)))2
qB(qB − 4qA)2 (30)
In t = 1 there is no closed-form solution for q∗
A and q∗
B. However, all derivatives of
Equations (25) to (30) with respect to b are positive. Therefore, when starting at
b = 10




for all supported qB, q∗
B = 0. This simpliﬁes all Equations (25) to (30). The only
closed-form solution for optimal qA, however, is q∗
A(b = 0) = 1
3k.
At qB = 0, producer surplus is the sum of (29) and (30):





















Hence total welfare is:
WFF(qB = 0) = −
b2 + 2bq∗
A(kq∗






The only ﬁxed value I can give is by substituting q∗
A(b = 0) = 1
3k into (33):




A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
(i): The second line of (13) has a unique solution, qF = 0, which leads to pF = b,
s = 1 and, subsequently, to producer surplus of PS = π = b − 0 = b, consumer
34surplus of CS = 1(b+0−b) = 0, and welfare of W = b+0 = b. This strategy is
an option for the monopolistic ﬁrm in the range b ≥ kq2
F + qF = 0. As I will see
below, it is optimal for the ﬁrm’s owners if b ≥ 1
16k.
(ii): The proﬁt function on the ﬁrst line of (13) is exactly half of the wel-
fare function on the ﬁrst line of (4), the social planner’s maximization problem.
Consequently, the same four candidates for equilibrium quality exist and, for the
same reasons as in the proof of Lemma 1.(ii), the proﬁt-maximizing quality in





6k . Substituting q∗











The proﬁts in (35) are strictly larger than the alternative from Lemma 3.(i)
(πF = b) iﬀ b < 1







into the boundary condition in (13), which requires that b < kq2 + q, reveals





6k is supported) as long as
b < 5
16k, which is larger than 1
16k.





6k if b <
1










consumers; i.e. s ∈ [1
3, 1
2] for b ∈ [0, 1
16k]. Producer surplus is as in (35), while

















If b ≥ 1
16k, a monopolistic ﬁrm will act as given in part (i) of this proof. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
(i): Consider b = 0: this comparison is a mere corollary to Lemmas 2.(ii) and
3.(ii).
(ii): For b > 0 we have to distinguish among three ranges:
1. Consider 0 < b < 1
16k: in this range I cannot characterize analytical solu-
tions for q∗
A(b > 0) in the competitive case. Therefore, I use a graphical
approach. In Figure 3 (LEFT panel) I provide a contour plot of iso-proﬁt
lines of πA depending on b (y-axis) and qA (x-axis). The lighter the color
35Figure 3: LEFT: Iso-proﬁt curves of πA, RIGHT: Iso-welfare diﬀerence curves
(WFF − WF); both for b ∈ [0, 1
16k] (y-axis), qA ∈ [0,1] (x-axis), k = 1
the higher πA. Notice that only values right of the thick line that starts
from (qA = 0,b = 0) are supported (left of the line, sA + sB ≤ 1 is hurt,
hence πA would change). The point (qA = 1
3k,b = 0), indicated by X, is the
only value of the optimal q∗
A I know explicitly. Starting from X, I drew the
dashed curve, which is an estimation of q∗
A for b > 0 based on the contour
plot.
The lines in the RIGHT panel display constant levels of the welfare diﬀer-
ence (WFF −WF), depending on the same b and qA domains as used in the
left panel. I copied X and the estimated q∗
A-curve from the left panel to the
right one. From Equations (34) and (37) I know that welfare at X is equal,
hence WFF − WF = 0. Following the estimated q∗
A-curve for b > 0 leads to
lighter regions of the contour plot. Hence, there WFF > WF.
2. Consider 1
16k ≤ b < 10
27k: still, I cannot ﬁnd analytical solutions for q∗
A in this
range. Just as for b < 1
16k, I have q∗
B = 0 and p∗
B = b
2. Hence the market
is covered both in the competitive and the monopolistic case (sA + sB =
1 = sF). Recall that qF = 0 and WF = b. In the competitive case, qA > 0.
Hence, some consumers enjoy positive utility from additional quality, while
no consumer is excluded from buying. Consequently, WFF > b = WF.
3. Consider b ≥ 10
27k: Here, I have WF = b < WFF = b + 8
243k (see Lemmas
362.(i) and 3.(i)).
Summarizing, WFF > WF ∀ b > 0. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
(i): The non-distribution constraints of both nonproﬁts (19) can only be satisﬁed
by pure or mixed strategies in t = 1 if the respective action combination is
qA = qB.40 Any other action combination leads to positive proﬁts for at least one
nonproﬁt. This insight produces two instant corollaries:
1. If qA = qB = q, there is no product diﬀerentiation and managers face
Bertrand price competition in t = 2. Hence, both of them will choose a
price that equals marginal costs, i.e. pA = pB = kq2.
2. There are inﬁnitely many supported solutions for qA = qB.
(ii): Now Equation (18) becomes important: pivotal owner τ’s net consumption
utility is non-negative if b + τq − kq2 ≥ 0. Optimizing this function for q and
considering the quality maximization goal (17) yields:










4k and generate proﬁts
of πCNN = 0 = PSCNN. By construction, total output is sA + sB = 1 − τ, which
results in consumer surplus and welfare of:
CSCNN = WCNN =





A.6 Proof of Lemma 5
(i): Building on (12) the proﬁts of the monopolist are given by π =
(b+q−kq2)2
4q .




2k . This would
lead to s = 0 = π = PS = CS = W. Any quality level that leads to positive sales
40Recall my assumption that managers in t = 2 have perfect information about both organi-
zations’ aspired quality levels before they produce and choose prices. Hence only the outcome
of t = 1 is important, not the mixed strategies resulting in it. Because of this I restrict the
analysis to pure strategies.
37also leads to positive proﬁts. To avoid violating the non-distribution constraint
these have to be donated to a charity, i.e. the nonproﬁt’s owners cannot enjoy
the fruits of proﬁts but proﬁts are not lost from a welfare perspective.
(ii): The pivotal owner τ expects the manager to price monopolistically.
Hence his net consumption utility is non-negative if b + τq − 1
2(b + q + kq2) ≥ 0.
His quality maximization goal (17) makes sure he chooses:
qCN =
2τ − 1 +
√
1 + 4bk − 4τ + 4τ2
2k
if b > 0 (40)




2k and sells to s = 1 − τ







4bk + (1 − 2τ)2 + 2τ − 1)


2k(b + τ − 1) + (2τ − 1)(
p




















4bk + (1 − 2τ)2 + 2τ − 1)


2k(b + τ − 1) + (2τ − 1)(
p
4bk + (1 − 2τ)2 + 2τ − 1

] (43)
(iii): If b = 0, the pivotal owner’s utility function is non-negative for τq −
1






k if b = 0 ∧ τ > 1
2
0 if b = 0 ∧ τ ≤ 1
2
(44)
The second line leads to pCN = b = 0,s = 1,PSCN = b = 0,CSCN = 0,WCN =
b = 0. The conditions in the ﬁrst line let the manager ask for pCN = 4τ2−2τ
2k , which








38A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
(i): Consider b = 0 ∧ τ ≤ 1
2: a comparison of Lemmas 4.(ii) and the second part
of 5.(iii) reveals that qCN < qCNN and WCN < WCNN.
(ii): Consider b = 0∧τ > 1
2: comparing Lemma 4.(ii) with the ﬁrst part of 5.(iii)
shows that qCN < qCNN. However, WCN < WCNN only if τ < .6. In contrast, if
b = 0 ∧ τ ≥ .6, WCN ≥ WCNN.
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In Figure 4 I plot this welfare diﬀerence (WCN −WCNN) depending on b and
τ, the quality preference of the pivotal owner. For some parameter-combinations,
e.g. for low τ and high b, this diﬀerence is positive.
To support this statement I plotted the same welfare diﬀerence (WCN −
WCNN) for one low and one high speciﬁc value of b in Figure 5. It is obvious that
in both graphs, for some τ, WCN − WCNN > 0. 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 6
(i): Consider τ = 0: Equation (22) easily shows that such a worker only suﬀers
from producing quality. Hence qWNN = 0, which leads to pWNN = 0, sA = sB =
1
2, PSWNN = 0, CSWNN = b = WWNN.
(ii): Consider τ > 0: as long as b ≥ kq2 all consumers will buy the product
because of marginal cost pricing of the managers, i.e. sA = sB = 1
2. In this
case, the pivotal owner sets qWNN = τ
2k. Hence pWNN = τ2
4k, PSWNN = 0,
CSWNN = 4bk+τ−τ2
4k = WWNN. This case is valid for b ≥ τ2
4k.
(iii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b < τ2
4k: in this range there is a quantity eﬀect on demand
if q is changed. Hence each manager sells to sj =
(1−θ)
2 consumers. The owner’s
objective function has only a minimum and a turning point on its support, but
no interior maximum. Therefore, the owners prefer to produce the maximum
39Figure 4: The welfare diﬀerence of a monopolistic consumer-dominated nonproﬁt
vs. competing consumer-dominated nonproﬁts: WCN − WCNN (on z-axis), de-
pending on the pivotal owner’s preference for quality τ ∈ [0,1] (x-axis) and the
basic utility b ∈ [0, 1
3] (y-axis); assuming k = 1.




2k , where sA = sB = 0. Then PSWNN = 0 =
CSWNN = WWNN. 
A.9 Proof of Lemma 7
(i): Consider τ = 0: Equation (23) shows that the pivotal owner only suﬀers from
producing additional quality. Hence qWN = 0. The manager asks for pWN = b,
sWN = 1, PSWN = b, CSWN = 0, and WWN = b.
(ii): Consider τ > 0: as long as b ≥ kq2 + q all consumers buy the product, i.e.
sWN = 1. In this case, the pivotal owner sets qWN = τ
2k. The manager asks for
the maximum price pWN = b (not according to (12)), leading to PSWN = b− τ2
4k,
CSWN = τ
4k and WWN = b + τ−τ2
4k . This case is valid for b ≥
τ(2+τ)
4k .
(iii): Consider τ > 0 ∧ b <
τ(2+τ)
4k : in this range there is a quantity eﬀect on
demand if q is changed. Hence the manager sells to consumers for a price and
a quantity as stated in (12). The objective function of the pivotal monopolistic
owner, subject to managerial monopoly pricing, is the same as for a pivotal owner
40Figure 5: The welfare diﬀerence of a monopolistic consumer-dominated nonproﬁt
vs. competing consumer-dominated nonproﬁts: WCN −WCNN, depending on the
pivotal owner’s preference for quality τ ∈ [0,1]; assuming k = 1 and b = 1
32 < 1
16
[LEFT] and b = 1
3 > 1
16 [RIGHT].
in a competing worker-dominated nonproﬁt who can only sell to half of buying
consumers and faces marginal cost pricing; see (23). Consequently, Lemma 6.(iii)
and its proof apply; only s = 0 instead of sA = sB = 0. 
A.10 Consumer-Owners Maximizing uτ: an Alternative
Speciﬁcation for Lemmas 4 and 5 and Proposition 2
Assume the pivotal owner in each consumer-dominated NFP maximizes his own
utility uτ
j (where τA = τB = τ), subject to the nondistribution constraint (π = 0).
Consider ﬁrst the case of competing consumer-dominated NFPs.
Because the owners’ objectives have no direct inﬂuence on managerial be-
havior, prices in t = 2 are the same as in Lemma 4: pA = pB = kq2. Foreseeing
that, pivotal owner τ solves in t = 1: maxqj uτ
j = b + τqj − kq2
j, which leads
to equilibrium qualities of qA = qB = τ
2k = qCNN and equilibrium prices of
pA = pB = τ2
4k = pCNN. Using this I ﬁnd that total demand is only elastic w.r.t.
changes in quality and price, i.e. sA + sB < 1, for τ > 2
√
bk. If τ ≤ 2
√
bk,
sA + sB = 1. The marginal buyer in the elastic case is θ = τ
2 − 2bk
τ , which leads
to PSCNN = 0 and:
CSCNN = WCNN =
(−4bk + (τ − 2)τ)2
16kτ
∀ τ > 2
√
bk (46)
In the inelastic case (τ ≤ 2
√
bk) the marginal buyer is θ = 0, which leads to
41PSCNN = 0 and:
CSCNN = WCNN = b +
τ − τ2
4k
∀ τ ≤ 2
√
bk (47)
Now consider a monopolistic consumer-dominated NFP. The manager sets
the price according to (12). Hence, the pivotal owner solves in t = 1: maxquτ =
b + τq −
b+q+kq2
2 , which leads to equilibrium quality of qCN = 2τ−1
2k ∀τ > 0.5
and qCN = 0, otherwise. The equilibrium price is pCN = 4bk−1+4τ2
4k as long as
demand is elastic, i.e. if τ >
√
1+4bk
2 . In this case, the marginal buyer is located
at θ = 1
4 + τ
2 − bk




64k(2τ−1) . I sum
up to:
WCN =







In the case τ ≤
√
1+4bk
2 , demand is inelastic and the marginal buyer is located at
θ = 0. Consequently, pCN = b and qCN = 0. This leads to CSCN = 0 and:





Now let me compare the duopoly and monopoly cases. To sustain the main
result of Proposition 2, that a merger between two consumer-dominated NFPs
can increase welfare, it is suﬃcient to show one supperted parameter constellation






bk. Hence I have to compare the welfare functions (47) and (48). For the
parameters assumed I ﬁnd:
WCNN = 0.528 < 0.545 = WCN  (50)
42